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Executive Summary
Purpose. This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Joint Evaluation
of the Mine Action Sector in Cambodia to the Royal Cambodian Government (RGC) and
the donor Technical Working Group on Mine Action (TWG). The objectives of the joint
evaluation are to:
a. Provide an independent assessment of the achievements and challenges of the
mine action sector in Cambodia;
b. Present strategic recommendations for the orientation of future donor support to
the sector, taking into account the need to strengthen the linkages between the
mine action sector and national development plans and programmes; and
c. Provide a common basis for a renewed donor-government partnership in the mine
action sector with improved national leadership and ownership.
Background on Mine Action in Cambodia. The contamination of land mines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Cambodia is not only severe, but also highly complex.
The K-5 mine belt, a swath of densely laid mines 700 kilometers long and 400-500
meters wide along the northwestern border of the country, is vast and densely
contaminated, but it is also rather well defined. In other parts of the war zone, mines
were laid, year after year, to establish defensive perimeters as combatants retreated to
safe ground after an annual dry season offensive to wait out the rains. These sporadic
and over-lapping mine fields are unmapped and follow no regular patterns.
The rule of thumb for UXO contamination is 10% of all expended ordnance. US
bombing data report over 500,000 tons of bombs dropped on Cambodia, much of it
fortunately in lightly inhabited northeastern provinces. Applying the rule of thumb, there
are potentially 50,000 tons of unexploded bombs in the countryside, plus additional
unexploded artillery shells, grenades, and mortar rounds expended by other combatants.
A survey carried out in 2002 concluded that 46% all Cambodian villages have some kind
of contamination. Due to limitations on the methodology employed, the survey also
reached the controversial conclusion that suspected contaminated area in Cambodia
totaled 4,500 square kilometers. If this figure is taken at face value, the mine action
problem will last for decades.
Major Findings and Recommendations.

1. The Scope of the Problem. The consultants observed that mine clearance has
been regarded as a legal problem from the standpoint of the Ottawa Convention or
a geographically impressionistic one from the point of view of the Level One
Survey (L1S). Both perspectives maximize the time needed to eliminate the
problem. The consultants tested a triage approach. Starting from the L1S total
suspected hazardous area of 4300 square kilometers, the following areas are
subtracted: land of little or no productive value, land already cleared, and land in
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use. The result is around 460 square kilometers which could probably be reduced
even more if land mapping data are updated. The clearance of this area could
probably be completed in 10-15 years, a much more attractive time frame from
the perspective of current and potential donors.
2. Funding Mechanisms. The team found that the funding methods now in use by
donors to finance mine action do not, in general, promote efficiency or
accountability. The team recommends a new funding mechanism, a demining
trust fund, that would provide funding to qualified demining operators on the
basis of competitive bidding. This contracting process would include strong
technical supervision and financial monitoring components. Finally, to support
de-centralized planning and priority setting at the provincial level, the trust fund
resources would be dedicated to meeting provincial priorities as determined by
Provincial Mine Action Committees.
3. CMAA. The CMAA is weak and ineffective. Donors and demining operators
lack confidence in the Secretariat’s leadership and, as a result, CMAA’s work is
largely ignored. As designed CMAA has too many responsibilities, some of
which overlap with other agencies. The team recommends that CMAA
concentrate on a few activities:
policy-making, resource mobilization,
preparation of annual reports, and establishing standards, for example. At the
same time, other more appropriate agencies should be directly tasked to carry out
activities that have a mine action aspect, but are more appropriately theirs. These
activities include mapping, land policy, land allocation and land titling (Ministry
of Land Management); mine risk education (Ministry of Public Health); and
victims’ assistance (Disability Action Council).
4. Mine Action Planning Units. The MAPUs directly support the Government’s decentralization policy and the provincial authorities capacities to plan and prioritize
mine clearance in a transparent manner. The team fully supports the MAPU
concept and the efforts of provincial governments and their development partners
to strengthen the implementation of these processes. The demining fund (see No.
2 above) will also serve to strengthen provincial decision-making.
5. The Army and the Police. Most far-sighted observers see the army and the police
as having the residual role in mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) in the long term. However, the team discovered questions regarding the
army’s current capacity to carry out mine clearance in accordance with national
standards. The police have so far had no formal role in mine action. Three
recommendations are made for the army and one for the police. The army may
make its personnel available as contract labor for qualified commercial demining
operators and thereby learn by doing; the army could organize de-mobilized
soldiers for employment by qualified demining operators; or the army could
request international technical assistance to develop its capacities. The police
should develop a long-term national capacity for EOD.
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6. Government-Donor Partnership for Mine Action. Why should the Governmentdonor partnership on mine action be renewed? Should donors continue to fund mine
action? There are several reasons why the answer to both of these questions is “yes”.
a. There is light at the end of the tunnel.
•

•

Though the mine and UXO problems will indeed last a long time in
Cambodia, a large part of the problem, the part that actually affects
people’s lives, can be resolved in a reasonable period of time, i.e., 10-15
years if fully funded and well managed.
Unlike other development problems, such as HIV/AIDS, the clearance of
an area ends the problem. It doesn’t come back again.

b. Mine clearance is essential for development and poverty reduction.
•
•
•
•

Population growth and internal migration will continue to bring people
into contact with land mines.
Mine action is an investment, not a cost. Mine action creates economic
opportunity and reduces health and safety costs.
In many areas in the country, development activity, such as, school
construction, wells for drinking water, and rural roads is impossible
without mine clearance.
Demining is a poverty reduction programme. Land mine contamination
directly affects the rural poor: they suffer the casualties and they are
deprived of the use of land.

c. The work can be done more efficiently.
•
•

Improved funding and prioritization mechanisms should focus the
management of mine clearance operations on clearly defined results.
New mine clearance techniques and approaches can increase productivity.
More land can be cleared for each dollar spent.
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1. Introduction
Purpose. The purpose of this report is to present the findings and recommendations of
the joint evaluation of the mine action sector in Cambodia to the Royal Cambodian
Government (RGC) and the donor Technical Working Group on Mine Action (TWG).
Objectives of the Joint Evaluation. The objectives of the joint evaluation are to:
•

Provide a joint and independent assessment of the achievements and challenges of
the mine action sector in Cambodia, building on lessons learnt from recent
individual donor evaluations and audit exercises;

•

Present strategic recommendations for the orientation of future donor support to
the sector, taking into account longer-term sustainability issues, national capacity
development and the need to strengthen the linkages between the mine action
sector and national development plans and programmes;

•

Provide a common basis for a revived donor-government dialogue and partnership
in the mine action sector, with improved national leadership and ownership.

The evaluation team was also requested to prepare a mapping of the mine action activities
currently being carried out in Cambodia. This inventory is presented in Annex 1.1.
Methodology. The evaluation has been carried out during November 2004 by a twoperson consultant team at the request of the TWG. UNDP has managed the exercise.
The evaluation team’s methodology has included:
•

desk review and analysis of the wide range of existing evaluation reports, project
reports and studies produced by national and international mine action
stakeholders (see Annex 1.2, List of Documents).

•

interviews with key stakeholders in Phnom Penh, including CMAA, CMAC,
RCAF, Disability Action Council, mine action operators, TWG members, and
concerned non-government organizations (see Annex 1.3, List of Persons
Interviewed).

•

a visit to Siem Reap province to meet with Halo Trust and CMAC Demining
Unit #6.

•

a group meeting with Australian Volunteers posted at four provincial Mine
Action Planning Units (MAPUs).

The Team will present its initial findings and main recommendations to Mine Action
TWG and Council of Ministers in the fifth week of its mission and finalize its report in
the first week of December 2004.
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Background on Mine Action in Cambodia. The contamination of land mines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Cambodia is not only severe, but also highly complex.
The K-5 mine belt, a swath of densely laid mines 700 kilometers long and 400-500
meters wide along the northwestern border of the country, is vast and densely
contaminated, but it is also rather well defined. In other parts of the war zone, mines
were laid, year after year, to establish defensive perimeters as combatants retreated to
safe ground after an annual dry season offensive to wait out the rains. These sporadic
and over-lapping mine fields are unmapped and follow no regular patterns.
The rule of thumb for UXO contamination is 10% of all expended ordnance. US
bombing data report over 500,000 tons of bombs dropped on Cambodia, much of it
fortunately in lightly inhabited northeastern provinces. Applying the rule of thumb, there
are potentially 50,000 tons of unexploded bombs in the countryside, plus additional
unexploded artillery shells, grenades, and mortar rounds expended by other combatants.
A survey carried out in 2002 concluded that 46% all Cambodian villages have some kind
of contamination. Due to limitations on the methodology employed, the survey also
reached the controversial conclusion that suspected contaminated area in Cambodia
totaled 4,500 square kilometers. If this figure is taken at face value, the mine action
problem will last for decades.
In regard to casualties, the CMVIS information system reported that mines and UXO
caused 115 deaths and 652 injuries people in 2003. In recent months, the proportion of
UXO injuries has been rising. This increase is attributed to the high price of scrap medal
that encourages scavenging for metal fragments and UXO.
The international community began to support demining during the UNTAC era in 1992
and has continued to provide relatively large support since then. CMAA reports that
from 1992-2003, 25,000 hectares of land was cleared of mines. In 2003, the three large
civilian demining operators cleared a total of approximately1600 hectares. A rough
estimate of international contributions for mine action in Cambodia for 2004 is $30
million when both cash and in-kind contributions are taken into account. It is not
surprising that, after years of contributions, the both the Government and the donor
community are frustrated with the high costs of mine action and apparently slow progress
towards reducing contamination.
It is towards the resolution of these daunting problems that the joint evaluation seeks to
provide some fresh insights.
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2.

Scoping the Problem

Key issue:
•

There is no country-wide quantitative analysis of the landmine and UXO problem.

Description
With the exception of the landmine impact survey (LIS)1 carried out in Cambodia
between 2000 and 2002, there is little literature that attempts to scope the problem in
Cambodia in any quantitative sense2 . The LIS provides spatial data on the extent of
contamination, but it (and indeed all other LIS conducted in other countries) relies for its
main data source on interviews carried out at the community level using participatory
rural appraisal (PRA) and rapid rural appraisal (RRA) techniques. Whilst PRA/RRA are
accepted methods for understanding livelihood issues (and so helpful for measuring the
‘impact’ of mine/UXO contamination) they are less accurate as means for measuring the
boundaries of the extent of that contamination. There is therefore an inbuilt error into the
LIS methodology (survey designers considered at the time that the geographic
information they would be gathering could be accurate within +/-250m).
The situation is exacerbated in areas where there are no communities to interview, and
contamination in such areas may go unreported. This may appear irrelevant in
considering the impact on today’s population, but it implies increasing error as time
passes; this is particularly relevant given the current progress rates predicted for mine
clearance in Cambodia.
Even given the limitations, the existing survey data, especially when combined with the
historical records of US bombing missions between 1969 and1973, do provide a rough
estimate of the extent of the contamination. However, it should be understood that the
figures generated by the LIS probably represent one end of a spectrum of probability and
it may be that the actual contaminated area is considerably smaller. There is also
considerable data available from other mapping sources on relevant issues such as land
use (produced by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)) and poverty
(produced by the World Food Program (WFP)).
Furthermore, the dominant paradigm in the humanitarian mine action sector is based on
the requirements of Article 5 of the 1997 Ottawa Convention, which requires that all
States Party must clear all of the mine contamination within 10 years of ratification of the
1

The survey team made a decision to use the older term “Level 1 Survey” as this was name of existing
survey practices in Cambodia (in both Khmer and English). at the time the survey was designed.
However, it was based on LIS methodologies and its design – and conduct - was approved by certifying
bodies. The newer term is used in the remainder of this report for ease of reference.
2

The CMAA Five-Year Plan does include an estimate of the area that might need to be cleared, but it is an
admitted guess based on an estimate of 10% of the LIS area.

8

convention3 . Whilst the Ottawa Convention does allow for States Party to seek extension
of the deadline, it specifically does not allow for states to leave uncleared areas that are
of little or no economic benefit.
Nevertheless, in spite of the requirements of the Ottawa Convention and concerted
resource mobilisation for several years, Cambodia continues to be highly contaminated
whilst several donors have expressed their unwillingness to fund what appears to be an
unending effort.
It is however the belief of the Team – and it is a belief that has been reflected
unanimously in interviews with donors – that the evaluation of the mine action sector
would be greatly facilitated by an attempt to scope the problem of landmine and UXO
contamination in Cambodia. Such an analysis is presented below.

Analysis
The following analysis is based on a number of assumptions:
•

That the existing LIS and other data provides the maximum probable spatial extent of
contamination

•

That it is possible to reduce the area to be cleared through elimination of land of little
or no economic value (such as rock outcrops or swamp) and to reduce the area by
removing that area that has already been cleared

•

That it is also possible to reduce the area by eliminating the areas that are already in
use and that are presenting no problem to existing communities

As a result of these assumptions, it may be possible to greatly reduce the extent of the
problem far below that suggested by the highest estimates of the LIS. This exercise is
carried out in Annex 2.1.

Results
The detail of calculations of cost, of benefit and the further establishment of the
analytical framework are set out in Annexes 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. The main
points are set out below.
•

3

The first and most obvious point is that there is a strong economic case for not
clearing all of the potentially contaminated areas. For example, the cost of clearing
contaminated forest exceeds its economic benefit. Reducing the total amount of area
to be cleared would have significant effect.
Full text of the Convention is available at www.icbl.org
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•

If the main problem area is indeed potential agricultural area but which is currently
abandoned, then existing data suggests that this is a problem that could be dealt with
in around 21 years, with some incremental changes in techniques and prices that
would allow a clearance rate of 20-22km2 per year at a average cost of $0.63-$0.65
per square metre.

•

However, it may be possible to further reduce these figures, through the following
modalities:
o Firstly, increasing dynamic efficiency over the life of the program should act
to drive costs down and clearance rates up (this is addressed in more detail in
the chapters on techniques and funding)
o Secondly, the mapping data available for this analysis is several years old:
new land use maps would doubtless show that there is less abandoned
farmland today than there was when the JICA land cover maps were
generated. It is estimated that the combination of re-mapping plus introduction
of efficiency measures could reduce the time needed to clear abandoned
agricultural land to around 10-15 years.
o Thirdly, it could be appropriate to focus attention on areas where communities
are more vulnerable (as a result of poverty) to the impact of mine
contamination. It may therefore be appropriate to focus resources on the
communities with the highest poverty problem. This issue is covered more in
the chapter on ‘approaches.’

More detailed analysis is included in Annex 2.4
Note: This scoping exercise does not address the other mine action interventions,
including explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), Mine Risk Education, or Victim
Assistance. These are discussed below.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
EOD teams are small, mobile teams that react to reports of unexploded ordnance (UXO)
being found by the population. They do not search areas of land and so cannot be said to
generate the same product – cleared land – as mine clearance. They do however act to
reduce the hazard from UXO and can therefore be said to generate humanitarian benefits
in terms of reduced incident rates.
For the purposes of this evaluation, the benefits of EOD intervention are not assessed in
any detail, due to the limited time available and the fact that, at present at least, EOD
activities still represent a comparatively small proportion of the budgets of mine action
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implementing agencies. It is assumed that, in principle, EOD intervention to deal with
items of UXO is worthwhile.
It would however be possible to use other indicators for assessing whether the
appropriate numbers of EOD teams are being provided by using response time analysis;
this is set out in Annex 2.5.
There is also increasing data available about the phenomenon of deliberate tampering
with live ordnance. It suggests that such deliberate risk taking behaviour can be regarded
as an indicator of vulnerability (i.e. it is an act carried out due to economic necessity).
This may become a criterion for allocation of EOD resources4 .
Mine Risk Education (MRE)
Mine Risk Education is, in essence, an educational process intended to reduce the number
of landmine/UXO casualties through the modification of behaviour. As a public health
intervention it appears to offer the potential of a simple and cost-effective means to
reduce the number of mine and UXO casualties. However, in the available literature and
in interviews the Team was unable to find any quantifiable justification for MRE
activities. Even the 2000 UNICEF evaluation was unable to provide any quantitative
evidence of the efficacy of MRE interventions.
This is not to say that MRE does not have a value; it is certainly a means to generate
reports of the presence of mines and UXO, and can therefore certainly assist mine action
implementing agencies gather data on the location and impact of contamination. What it
does tell us is that, even after several years of MRE implementation, the mine action
community has little idea about the impact of MRE interventions in any quantitative
sense.
It would be premature to call for an end to MRE activity. However, it would better
inform the debate if more analysis was carried out on this issue. For example, a
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey could be carried out to assess the
actual effect of MRE interventions. Such a survey is clearly outside the scope and
resources of this Evaluation but the Team recommend that one is carried out as soon as
possible. UNICEF have already indicated their willingness to facilitate a KAP survey for
this purpose.

4

Presentation by Richard Moyes, author of “Tampering: deliberate handling and use of live ordnance in
Cambodia” 2 December 2004.
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Mine/UXO Victim Assistance
The final major mine action intervention to be considered here is that of mine/UXO
victim assistance. In Cambodia today, disabilities have numerous causes. Whilst the
numbers of mine/UXO victims is a humanitarian tragedy, and may be regarded as a valid
reason for donors to engage in the sector, there is a fundamental contradiction between
the idea of using the cause of injury as a means of prioritising treatment, compared to a
conventional approach by which the severity of injury is used to assess priorities.
At present, the needs of the disabled are addressed almost entirely by a large number of
non-governmental organizations. It may be more appropriate for donors to consider the
impact of mine and UXO victims on the weak public health and social welfare services
and provide resources to redress this balance. Unfortunately, while there is now excellent
data on the number of mine and UXO casualties in Cambodia, there is very little grasp of
how these numbers relate to the overall disability problem in Cambodia as a whole. This
suggests a need to conduct a survey to identify the overall problem in Cambodia which
would help put the impact of mine and UXO casualties into context.
In short, the Team believes that the provision of disability assistance should be made in
terms of general support to the problem of disability in Cambodia – a valid need –
without trying to link this support to mine victims. This is consistent with the approach
advocated by the Cambodian Disability Action Council which would appear to provide a
suitable means to coordinate such activities. It is therefore not considered further in this
Evaluation.

Recommendations
•

Review of the status of Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention, in recognition that not all
land will be cleared, in order to identify the Cambodian position vis-à-vis Article 5 in
terms of clearance plans

•

Obtain latest possible data on land use and poverty in order to further scope the mine
problem in Cambodia, through the existing JICA and WFP methodologies

•

Engagement of all practical means to improve cost effectiveness of mine clearance

•

Conduct a KAP survey to identify impact of MRE and adjust funding levels and
information vectors accordingly

•

Survey Cambodia to quantify the overall problem of disability in Cambodia.

•

De-linking of mine victim assistance as a means to raise funds for mine action from
provision of disability assistance services.
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3.

Funding Arrangements for Mine Action

Key Issues
§
§

Funding for mine action has been at a high level for several years. However, there
are signs of donor “fatigue” and decreasing funding for the future.
In many cases, existing funding mechanisms do not include incentives for
efficiency or mechanisms for quality assurance in mine action activities.

As illustrated in Annex 1.1, several donors currently provide funding for a wide variety
for mine action activities in Cambodia. The primary method for funding these activities
is simply a grant to a service provider. Grant funding for mine action has been traditional
since the work began in Cambodia. Mine clearance activities have been characterized as
“humanitarian” mine action, with the priority on saving lives and preventing injuries.
Financing mine action on a grant basis can be seen as an extension of post-conflict
emergency funding.
Three professional demining organizations are the main recipients of mine action grants:
CMAC, the Halo Trust and MAG. In general, these three organizations use grant funds to
carry out programmes of mine action that they have designed. The RCAF has also
reportedly carried out demining on road and other infrastructure projects using
Government funds or proceeds of loans to the Government from international
development banks.
CMAC. The largest amount of grant funding goes to CMAC. Donors provide funds and
in-kind contributions of expertise and equipment. Funds are provided in two ways:
directly to CMAC for specific projects and through the UNDP Mine Action Trust Fund.
Trust Fund contributions may be earmarked for projects or given for general institutional
support.
Trust Fund and bi-lateral contributions to CMAC are presented on Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1

Year

2001
2002
2003
20046
2005 est.

Cash Contributions to CMAC 2001-2005 (US$)5
UNDP
Bi-lateral Other
Total
% UNDP
Trust
Projects
Income
Income
Trust
Fund
Fund
4,746,878 2,602,852 108,453 7,458,183 64%
6,205,854 4,359,533 263,555 10,828,942 62%
5,188,449 3,862,598 1,421
9,052,468 57%
4,521,412 5,017,871 n/a
9,597,192 47%
6,900,000

%
Bi-lateral
Grants
35%
35%
43%
53%

The data above illustrate the gradual decline in both absolute and relative terms of the
importance of the contributions to CMAC through the UNDP Trust Fund. Conversely,
5
6

Sources: CMAC Annual Reports and Work Plans
The data for 2004 are as of 31 July 2004, but they are likely to approximate full year contributions.
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bi-lateral contributions are rising both absolutely and as a proportion of total CMAC
resources. Some Trust Fund donors have decided to shift their support from mine action
to other thematic areas; other bi-laterals who plan to continue to supporting CMAC have
expressed the desire to give greater visibility to their contributions than the Trust Fund
now affords.
In addition to the cash contributions described above, CMAC’s resources are augmented
by in-kind contributions from several donors. This year, for example, Japan is providing
brush cutting, transport and protective equipment worth $16.0 million.
Belgium, New
Zealand and Japan have been providing technical advisors in such specialties as disposal
of explosive ordnance, training, logistics and information technology.
Halo Trust. For the current year, the Halo Trust is receiving grants for mine action from
five bi-lateral donors and five international NGOs. The Trust’s budget for 2004, which
cannot be precisely calculated as some project budgets are not on a calendar year basis, is
estimated at around $4.0 million.
MAG. MAG also has diverse funding base, receiving grants from six bi-lateral and
multi-lateral donors and four international NGOs. MAG’s 2004 budget, which like
Halo’s is difficult to calculate for the calendar year, is roughly $3.5 million. In the case
of MAG’s NGO donors, funding is provided as a fee for services. The NGOs hire MAG
to clear mines in designated areas where they are implementing development projects.
These arrangements are established as partnerships based on memoranda of
understanding rather than as commercial transactions.
RCAF. World Bank and Asian Development Bank reported that their rural road
rehabilitation loans require the Government to undertake mine clearance for the road
right-of-way. Thus, it appears that RCAF is funded directly by the Government from
loan proceeds or counterpart funds. The mechanism by which the Government provides
funds to RCAF to do mine clearance is unclear.
Quality Assurance. The CMAA Secretariat is theoretically responsible for licensing of
demining operators in Cambodia and assurance that their work meets technical quality
standards.
In practice, the Secretariat does not have sufficient capacity to fully
implement either of these functions. Thus, demining operators are largely self-regulated.
CMAC’s approach to quality assurance is to review, strengthen and implement its own
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for demining and EOD. Similarly, both Halo Trust
and MAG follow their own strict operational protocols for demining and EOD.
Performance and Financial Monitoring. During 1999-2000, CMAC encountered serious
financial management problems. Auditors rated CMAC’s internal controls “seriously
deficient” in 1999. Since then, CMAC has been striving to improve its management,
performance review and accountability. A management and financial audit conducted by
Ernst and Young Malaysia for the period 2002-03 rated CMAC as “satisfactory” and
verified progress towards implementation of previous audit recommendations.
In
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February 2004, CMAC received ISO 9001 certification for its operational processes
(though not its results).
Donors monitor of their financial contributions to CMAC as well. This monitoring
consists of a variety of financial management and performance review processes. UNDP
project assistance for CMAC and the UNDP Trust Fund require regular progress reports,
financial reports and joint review meetings. Bi-lateral donors do their own monitoring
and supervision to varying degrees of rigorousness.
To implement their accountability standards, Halo Trust and MAG both rely on
international professional managers, standard accounting and reporting procedures and
regular financial audits.
Analysis
The current grant-based funding arrangements for demining operations do not encourage
efficiency or accountability. This conclusion applies to both Trust Fund and to most bilateral grants to CMAC. In some cases, however, bi-lateral donors have established
stringent financial and technical monitoring arrangements7 .
Under current funding arrangements, donors pay the three main professional demining
operators on the basis of the operators’ perception of their costs. Each operator uses a
different method to calculate its costs. Despite these differences, the donors are
essentially price-takers and do not appear to challenge the deminers’ costs. In other
words, there is no market for demining services and consumers (donors) pay the asking
price. (In the case of RCAF, the funding arrangements with the Government are not
transparent, but the military appear to be another grant recipient.)
In the absence of competitive pressures, the incentives to reduce costs and innovate are
weak and rely wholly on self-motivation by the demining organisations. For example,
MAG, which has pioneered a low cost demining technique, “proximity demining”, under
which local residents are trained and supervised by MAG to carry out demining in their
districts, developed this approach not primarily for cost reduction, but to enable income
generation in rural areas. However, MAG recognise it has interesting implications for
cutting costs (as modeled in the analysis at Annex 2.4).
The lack of competition for demining services has also served to maintain the high labor
costs of demining services. Demining wages were set at high levels when UNTAC
commenced demining due to the perception that demining was “dangerous work” and
that deminers were putting their lives on the line. Given the relative ease of training
deminers, the industry’s safety record, and a large pool of unemployed willing to work
for lower wages, this assumption should be re-examined.

7

Not all of these restrictions are helpful: at least one donor will pay deminers’ salaries but not those of the
local staff employed in the headquarters, which is designed to stop waste but is unfairly punishing to
organisations that already have a small central management team. Changing to an output-based contracting
arrangement should allow avoidance of such problems.
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In addition to having no control over prices, the donors have little or no control over the
quality of the work that they are paying for. Most receive no competent independent
verification of demining results. While some donors vigilantly monitor the projects they
fund, most donors lack the technical competence to assess the quality of the results
obtained. The common measures of results in demining – number of mines cleared, costs
of clearance in cents per square meter – provide interesting information, but they really
don’t tell the donors whether they got their money’s worth.
Recommendations

§
§
§
§

Open up eligibility for UNDP Trust Fund resources to all qualified demining
operators.
Use the Trust fund to fund demining on the basis of competitive bidding.
Target the Trust Fund on provincial demining priorities determined by the MAPU
process.
Establish independent quality control for Trust Fund demining contracts.

The recommendations here apply to the UNDP Trust Fund, the only element in the
funding arrangements that is relatively easy to adjust. However, the team recommends
that bi-lateral donors consider the rationale for these changes in the Trust Fund
arrangements as it may apply to their bi-lateral funding.
The UNDP Trust Fund should be re-constituted as the UNDP Demining Trust Fund and
should fund demining services on the basis of competitive bidding. The Trust Fund
should be targeted on the unfunded provincial priorities identified by the provincial
process for planning and prioritization of mine clearance that is facilitated by the Mine
Action Planning Units in each of the five heavily-mined northwestern provinces. In other
words, the Trust Fund would provide a mechanism to support the de-centralized decisionmaking of provincial governments on their demining priorities. Trust Fund contracts
should be large enough to attract new entrants into the demining business in Cambodia
and to enable demining operators to maintain orderly workflow and staffing
arrangements.
The arrangements for the new Trust Fund should include:
§
§

§

An advisory committee comprised of representatives of the contributing donors
and the CMAA. This committee would address policy issues such as resource
allocation among provinces.
A Trust Fund manager. UNDP could manage the Trust Fund directly or
outsource management to a professional procurement agent. Other management
options to consider include other UN procurement agencies (UNOPS or IAPSO),
another donor organization or a project dedicated to the management of the Trust
Fund.
A Contract Supervision/Quality Assurance capacity. Demining services provided
on a contractual basis will require the technical and supervisory capacity to carry
out quality control and certification for payment that services have been delivered
in accordance with contracts.
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§

Start-up assistance to design a template contract or contracts for demining
services, criteria for short-listing and selection of contractors, operational policies
and procedures for the Trust Fund, and the establishment of links with provincial
governments.
A gradual phase-in period while the existing trust fund arrangements phase out.

§
§
Further specifications for the proposed trust fund are provided in Annex 3.1.

Impact on CMAC. What impact would the revision of current trust fund arrangements
have on CMAC? An abrupt shift in funding would of course be disruptive for CMAC.
However, as noted above, the new arrangements should be phased in gradually to avoid
disruption. What’s more, CMAC is likely to win tis share of contracts from the new trust
fund which would serve to maintain its income stream.
In the longer term, the shift to contract funding should further stimulate ongoing trends in
CMAC towards improved productivity. These include, for example, the integration of
dog teams with brush-cutting teams and manual deminers, improved cost accounting, and
cost cutting measures.
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4. National Institutional Arrangements for Mine Action
Key Issues
•
•
•

The CMAA has not been effective. The Authority has too many assigned
responsibilities and many of these responsibilities overlap with those other
agencies.
The arrangements for de-centralized planning and prioritization of mine clearance
strengthen ongoing Government efforts for de-centralization to provincial
authorities.
RCAF has the potential to provide a mine action sustainable capacity, but there
are persistent doubts about the ability of RCAF to meet national standards at
present.

Overview of Legal and Policy Framework. The legal and policy framework for mine
action in Cambodia consists primarily of the decrees, sub-decrees and policy statements
that pertain to:
• the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA);
• the Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC);
• the arrangements for socio-economic management of mine clearance in the
provinces (PMAC and MAPU) and the related arrangements for allocation of
cleared land;
• RCAF.
CMAA
Legal Framework. Royal Decree No. 177 (6 September 2000) constitutes the CMAA as
an inter-ministerial body chaired by the Prime Minister. The CMAA is to “manage all
clearing activities of remaining land mines and unexploded ordnance and the assistance
to victims of landing mines”, to act as the sole representative of the RGC at international
meetings on land mines, UXO and victims’ assistance, and to sign on behalf of the RGC
“any agreements, protocols and contracts of bilateral aid regarding mine action and
unexploded ordnance clearance, and assistance to victims…” 8
Major responsibilities of CMAA listed in the decree9 include:
• development of policies on mine action and UXO clearance and assistance to
victims;
• coordination of all mine action and UXO clearance and assistance to victims;
• mobilization of technical and financial resources within Cambodia and abroad;
• licensing national and international demining operators working in Cambodia;
• managing a database on mine action and UXO clearance;
• development of a policy on the use of demined land; and
8
9

Article 2 of Decree No. 177
Article 3 of Decree No. 177
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•

implementation in Cambodia of the Ottawa Convention on land mines.

Subsequently, Sub-decree No. 76 (dated 8 August 2001) set out the organization and
functioning of the CMAA. The operational arm of the CMAA is its Secretariat General.
The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General assisted by two deputies. The
Secretariat is to have six functional departments.
Analysis of CMAA Performance
Management.
The CMAA Secretariat’s operational effectiveness is seriously
undermined due to the lack of confidence on the part of international donors and
demining operators in its Secretary General. While all parties maintain cordial relations,
the level of distrust is such that these key stakeholders simply do not take the Secretariat
seriously and keep their interactions with it to a minimum. In this environment, the
Secretariat cannot provide meaningful coordination or policy guidance for mine action.
Most agencies working on mine action ignore the Secretariat and deal directly with each
other as necessary.
Organization and Staffing. The high-level inter-governmental body chaired by the Prime
Minister that constitutes the CMAA has never met. As a result, the functions of the
CMAA are carried out directly by its Secretariat10 . As established so far, this Secretariat
is comprised of a Secretary General, three Deputies, and 34 staff members. The staffing
arrangements include four personnel working on the database who are paid by CIDA and
seven personnel working on monitoring and socio-economic management who are paid
by DFID. Thus, only 23 of the staff are Government employees.
While Departments have been established within the Secretariat, the personnel seem to be
informally organized around a set of technical functions – planning, laws and regulations,
monitoring, database management and mapping, and socio-economic management of
mine clearance – and administrative functions. The technical functions receive a
significant degree of donor support.
Functional Analysis. The relevant decree sets 14 major responsibilities for the CMAA.
The Secretariat does not have sufficient capacity to implement them. There are a number
of questions about whether the CMAA is the best home for certain functions. Further,
some of the functions are highly technical and would be impossible to implement without
substantial external assistance. Indeed, at present, most of the outputs produced are the
products of international experts and consultants and donor-supported national staff
attached to the Secretariat.
The status of implementation of the Secretariat’s functions is reviewed below:
• Policies and strategies on mine action and UXO clearance are prepared by the
UNDP Chief Technical Advisor attached to the CMAA Secretariat. Virtually all
of these documents are circulated as drafts that have yet to become final versions.
10

In common parlance, when people refer to the CMAA, they are actually referring to its Secretariat.
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•

•

•

•
•

•

•

Coordination of mine action is in transition. The sub-decree on socio-economic
management of mine clearance has de-centralized much of this function to
provincial authorities. At the national level, past efforts of the Secretary-General
to coordinate donors have not been successful. However, the Council of
Ministers has recently convened a Government-Donor working group on mine
action to prepare for the Consultative Group meeting in December. Up to the
present time, however, the donors have been holding their own coordination
meetings.
Similarly, NGOs have set up a Mine Action Forum to share
experience and address issues of common interest.
The Disability Action Council (DAC) coordinates assistance to victims of mines
and UXO as well as assistance to all other persons with disabilities in close
collaboration with the Ministry of Social Welfare. The Secretariat has not
attempted to establish any capacity in this area.
The mobilization of technical and financial resources within Cambodia and
abroad is de facto carried out by the donors and demining operators, though the
Secretary General has attempted to mobilize financial resources at international
meetings on mine action.
The Secretariat has issued all four demining operators with “provisional”
licenses.
The licensing process lacks transparency and subsequent field
inspections are reported by observers to be sporadic and perfunctory exercises.
Government and donor-supported staff maintain the Secretariat’s database and
archives on mine action and UXO clearance. An international consultant does the
analytical work. Demining operators do not rely on the database unit’s maps
however. Each demining operator does its own survey and mapping.
The policy on the socio-economic management of mine clearance and related
guidelines were prepared by the UNDP Chief Technical Advisor. An official
Government sub-decree was actually passed to implement this policy. This subdecree, which in effect de-centralizes most of the planning and coordination work
on mine action to provincial authorities, is potentially the CMAA Secretariat’s
most important achievement. Monitoring the implementation of this policy in the
provinces is beyond the capacity of the small central staff, however.
The Secretariat is responsible for implementation of Cambodia’s obligations
under the Ottawa Convention on land mines. The Secretary General will report
on national compliance to the Convention at an international conference in
Nairobi in December 2004 and seek to mobilize resources for Cambodia.

•
Given the general and specific problems cited above, some re-consideration is in order to
determine whether or not these functions are to be carried out in the future and if so, by
whom.

In order to devise recommendations for CMAA, the consultant team reviewed the
Authority’s assigned functions and considered the advantages and disadvantages of
options for their disposition. This review of options with advantages and disadvantages
of each is presented in Annex 4.1. The five options considered were:
1) do nothing;
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2) transfer the function to another agency;
3) outsource the implementation of the function while the Authority retains
responsibility for it;
4) strengthen the existing function; or
5) re-design and strengthen the function.
On the basis of this analysis, the consultants have concluded that the CMAA Secretariat
should focus its limited capacity on a narrower set of functions. The recommended
disposition of other functions now assigned to CMAA is described below.
Recommendations for the CMAA Secretariat
The CMAA Secretariat should focus on a shortlist of core functions and consider
transferring some functions to other appropriate agencies. If and when donors are
satisfied with the management arrangements at the Secretariat, they may wish to provide
capacity development assistance or operational support. The core functions should be
limited to:
1. National policy making related to mine clearance and UXO;
2. Providing guidance on national plans and priorities to de-centralized
provincial MAPUs;
3. Preparing an annual report on mine action based on reports submitted by mine
action operators and an annual consolidated report on MAPU activities based
on reports submitted by provincial authorities;
4. Establishing and maintaining standards for mine action;
5. Management of a donor-supported arrangement for outsourced licensing and
quality assurance of demining operators;
6. Mobilizing national and international resources for mine action;
7. Acting as Government representative and the secretariat for the
implementation of the Ottawa Convention.
For the following functions, CMAA could retain a focal point, but operational
responsibility should be transferred or confirmed to reside with other agencies as follows:
1. Mine risk education should be carried out by demining operators and
integrated into Ministry of Public Health IEC programmes and Ministry of
Education in and out of school programmes wherever it is appropriate.
2. The policy on the use of land cleared of mines and its implementation should
be clearly designated as a responsibility of the Ministry of Land Management.
3. Mine and UXO mapping, databases, and archives should be cleared
designated as a responsibility of the Ministry of Land Management at the
national and provincial levels. Provincial DLM staff should lead or take
active roles in provincial MAPUs.
4. The responsibility for coordination and resource mobilization for mine and
UXO victims’ assistance should be clearly defined as the responsibility of the
Disability Action Council.
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CMAC
Legal and Policy Framework. Royal Decree NS/RKT/0801/264 (dated 8 August 2001)
revised the legal status of the CMAC and established it as “a national institution to
provide mine action services for humanitarian and development projects.” As a result,
the policy making and regulatory functions related to mine action were transferred to the
nearly created Cambodian Mine Action Authority and CMAC continues in the role of
mine action service provider.
Under the decree, CMAC is to carry out the following programmes: mine awareness,
minefield information and survey, mine clearance including explosive ordnance disposal,
and training in mine action. The priorities for implementation of these programmes are:
• humanitarian purposes in high casualty areas;
• economic purposes for the expansion of agriculture, rehabilitation, national
reconstruction or development projects.
Review of CMAC
The review team was not tasked nor did it have time for a detailed assessment of
CMAC’s performance.
The following observations synthesize the views of key
informants and the findings of other evaluations.
CMAC is the largest professional mine action service provider in Cambodia both in terms
of size of its budget – currently around $10.0 million per year - and the amount of land
reported as cleared – 971 hectares in 2003. As a Government organization, CMAC is
also the recipient of large amounts of official development assistance from international
donors over and above funds for mine action operations. This assistance is in the form of
funds for institutional support and in-kind grants of technical assistance and equipment.
Observers of CMAC’s performance, both insiders and outsiders, report a full spectrum of
views, all of which can be seen to contain kernels of truth. At one end of the spectrum
are CMAC champions who view the organization as a unique success story in Cambodia:
a national institution that is actually doing its job and performing at international
standards of accountability. Indeed, a number of observable elements bolster this
position: CMAC’s articulate and forward looking management, ISO 9001 certification,
satisfactory audit ratings, timely and informative reports, persistent self-improvement
efforts, openness to new ideas, and a record of verifiable results.
A less charitable point of view regards CMAC as an organization that doesn’t work very
well, but can be made to perform provided that there is a high degree of conditionality
and supervision of its performance.
At the other extreme are credible observers who report widespread rent-seeking behavior,
reluctance to innovate (e.g., the persistence of two men per lane demining), excessively
high operating costs, and a high level of absenteeism.
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Recommendations for CMAC
Given the diversity of credible views above, the review team is reluctant to offer
definitive prescriptions for CMAC. The organization should obviously continue to build
on its strengths.
To provide further impetus to operational efficiency, the team
recommends 1), a gradual exposure to market forces in creation of a market place for
demining services among donors (see chapter 6 below) and 2) a bit less largesse on the
part of its donors so that CMAC will be motivated towards financial self-sufficiency.
Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance in the Provinces
Legal Framework. The Council of Ministers recently passed the sub-decree entitled
“Socio-economic Management of Mine Clearance Operations” on 17 September 2004.
This sub-decree essentially de-centralizes the planning and prioritization of mine
clearance operations to the provincial level. The provincial governor is responsible for
ensuring that all mine clearance activities are in compliance with national strategy, plans
and regulations for mine clearance and that they have taken into account commune
development plans. The provincial governor must ensure transparency and fairness in the
allocation of cleared land. Land to be allocated to the landless poor shall be in
accordance with the sub-decree No. 19, “Social Land Concessions” (dated 19 March
2003).
Review of Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance. The new sub-decree sets
out successor arrangements for the Land Use Management Unit (LUPU) mechanism that
was established in 1998 in the five heavily contaminated northwestern provinces to assist
in the selection of land for demining and the allocation of demined land. An evaluation
of the LUPU support project11 found serious capacity deficiencies in the LUPUs and a
tendency for their processes to be dominated by demining operators and NGOs.
The new sub-decree empowers provincial authorities to plan and prioritize demining in
their provinces and thereby significantly strengthens the LUPU mechanism, henceforth to
be known as MAPU (Mine Action Planning Unit). A team of five Australian Volunteers
has just been fielded to address MAPU capacity issues. Some funding for MAPU
operations will be provided through the Seila/PLG programme. A yet to be finalized
CIDA-funded project may provide GIS mapping services and/or support the development
of provincial GIS mapping capacity. The CMAA Secretariat is also attempting to direct
and participate in the MAPU activities.
At this writing, a number of challenges face the MAPU mechanisms:
• how to operationalize the prioritization of areas to be cleared; what selection
criteria should be applied with what weights (see Chapter 5, Approaches);
• how to build ownership among provincial officials for an objective process of
priority-setting; how the process will be made transparent;
11

Report of an external evaluation of the Handicap International Belgium project “Support for the planning
of demining and the utilization of demined land in Cambodia, commissioned by the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, October 2003.
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•

how to build harmonious relationships with demining operators that enable the
reconciliation of their preferences with provincial demining priorities;
• how to engage the provincial Department of Land Management in land allocation
and titling processes for cleared land;
• how and whether the CIDA project can be effectively integrated into the work of
the MAPU and the provincial Department of Land Management.
In addition, no plans have been made yet for a MAPU process in other provinces with
landmine contamination.
Recommendations for Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance
The Ministry of Land Management should be formally tasked with responsibility at the
provincial level for the implementation of land management procedures – land allocation
and land titling – that are embedded in the MAPU process. Overall responsibility for
MAPU activities should remain with the Provincial Governor. At present, the MLM does
not appear to be ready to assume this role in all MAPU provinces so there may be a onetwo year transition period. In the meantime, donor resources should be targeted on
strengthening the relevant PLM capacities and related central MLM support capacities
rather than supporting parallel systems in the MAPUs.
Donor resources devoted to supporting MAPUs should be harmonized in concept and
practice. The joint steering committee set up under the AVI project should provide the
appropriate venue for coordination. As a matter of urgency, the CIDA-funded project
needs to be clearly integrated into provincial arrangements and its role in capacity
building clearly defined.
RCAF
There is a general need to increase the volume of mine clearance capability in Cambodia,
and some donors have wondered whether RCAF can be used more in this regard,
especially as they have a potential to operate in a sustainable manner once international
funding has ceased.
Policy Framework. The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) have been assigned a
role in mine action by the Government for the clearance of mines and UXO that affect
infrastructure projects, such as road construction or rehabilitation.
The CMAA
Secretariat has issued RCAF with a provisional license as a demining operator.
Review of RCAF Operations
Data reported by the CMAA Secretariat attribute one half of all demining carried out in
Cambodia to RCAF. The review team was unable to obtain detailed information
regarding RCAF operations, such as maps, clearance reports or financial reports, or to
view ongoing clearance activities. In addition, all of the professional demining operators
are highly skeptical of the reported statistics.
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Previous analysis of RCAF’s capability has expressed doubts of their ability to conduct
mine clearance to a suitable standard12 . The Team visited the RCAF engineering
command but was unable to obtain evidence to refute the doubts that have been expressed
by previous observers. RCAF officers also openly described their lack of equipment and
the training to operate it.
From fragmentary information assembled from a number of sources, it appears that
RCAF has been engaged in mine clearance on road projects funded by the World Bank
and ADB. The RGC has apparently used loan proceeds or Government counterpart funds
to finance RCAF to demine road right of ways. The clearance methodology is unclear,
but given the huge areas involved, manual demining would not have been possible. The
large reported clearance areas are likely to be the result of multiplying the 30 to 40 meter
right of way by the length of a road.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that RCAF’s clearance methods are unsafe and that
accidents have occurred. RCAF’s involvement in demining has also brought accusations
of land-grabbing of cleared land, though the Team was unable to verify these allegations.
Nevertheless, RCAF may become the residual home for mine action and/or UXO
disposal after the wave of donor-funded activity passes in a few years so there is a need
to engage RCAF in mine action in a manner that will encourage responsible demining.
Recommendations for RCAF
RCAF could be engaged more directly in mine action through the following range of
mechanisms, which are set out in terms of the ease with which they could be introduced
in the short term.
•

Option One. Provide labour for qualified demining organisations. This would allow
donors to interface with an organisation capable of meeting liability requirements. It
would also allow RCAF personnel to receive on-the-job training in mine action
project management and equipment operation and so prepare them for a time when
they would be operating independently of any donor assistance.

•

Option Two. Ex-RCAF personnel could be engaged as civilian deminers under a
Demobilisation, Demilitarisation and Re-integration (DDR) project, such as that
successfully piloted in Afghanistan. This could be linked with the provision of a small
parcel of land to each demobilised soldier at the end of his engagement as a deminer.

•

Option Three. Provision of technical assistance to RCAF to allow RCAF to compete
directly for infrastructure projects. This would involve letting a contract for an agency
to provide the technical assistance service to RCAF. However it is not possible to
guarantee that RCAF (or indeed any one particular demining agency) would win the
bids in a tendering process.

12

See the Cambodia case study in the GICHD “Role of the Military in Mine Action” 2003.
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•

Option Four: Train and equipping a sustainable EOD capability within the Police or
Army, in order to ensure there is a residual EOC capacity in Cambodia even after
foreign donations cease. This would involve training and equipping but not provision
of operating costs for the EOD teams.

All of these options would allow the development of a truly sustainable capacity to a
greater or lesser extent. Option One has the advantage in that it would be easier to initiate
in the short term and would allow customers to feel confident in the quality of the results
whilst also allowing capacity development within RCAF.
Royal Cambodian Police
As mentioned above, there is potential in the police force for the development of an EOD
capacity. This would build on the recent successes with the Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW) reduction program. Indeed, it would be an important adjunct to such
activity as the police are reportedly receiving items of ammunition and explosives when
they tour villages to collect weapons.
Furthermore, the police have an important potential role in collecting and passing on
information about UXO to EOD teams, and at present there is no national policy for
this13 .
Cambodia Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS)
CMVIS, conducted jointly by the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and Handicap
International, is probably a world leader in terms of mine victim data collection and its
resources are invaluable in problem analysis (and indeed in the preparation of this report).
There are some criticisms about the data collection methodology. For example, in
Chapter 2 above, CMVIS data report that schoolchildren who are mine accident victims
have not received MRE. These data may be the result of interviewees not wanting to
admit that they had been warned. There are similar suggestions that ‘tampering’
casualties don’t like to admit that they were scavenging for scrap metal leading to a
suspiciously large number of adult UXO victims ‘playing’ with UXO. However, these
are comparatively minor problems with the CMVIS product, and CMVIS personnel
appear to be objective and eager to develop their data collection methods. Unfortunately,
at the time of writing CMVIS is suffering a potential funding shortfall (a shortfall of
$40,000 for 2005). Hopefully this will be resolved in the near future as it is a resource too
important to lose.
The funding shortfall issue does suggest that even the CRC is a truly sustainable home
for CMVIS. It would be rational to consider housing CMVIS within a government
institution or under the aegis of the Disability Action Council (DAC). This would allow
similar data gathering methodology to be used to chart general disability problems (such

13

As voiced in the workshop on UXO Tampering held on 2 Dec 2004.
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as the Road Traffic Accident Victim Information System (RTAVIS) being developed by
Handicap International) in a sustainable manner.
Interestingly, CMVIS is a core national function that is currently managed outside of
CMAA but is responsive to national policy coordination. This would appear to act as
supporting evidence for the ‘outsourcing’ of some CMAA functions as proposed above.
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5. Understanding Approaches to Mine Clearance
Key issues
•

There is a general concern amongst respondents that demining is slow and
expensive.

•

Given that there is more of a contamination problem than there are resources
available to deal with it, prioritisation strategies must be developed to allocate
resources in the most effective manner possible.

Description
There are three main tools in the demining “toolbox”. These are:
•

Manual mine clearance, by which a deminer uses a combination of a metal detector and
hand tools to search land

•

Mechanical devices, which are primarily used in the Cambodian context to clear
vegetation and remove the threat of tripwires

•

Mine detection dogs (MDD) which are trained to react to the smell of vapour from
landmines and indicate their presence from a safe distance.

These tools will be considered in more detail in the chapters below on standards (Chapter
6) and techniques (Chapter 7).
Traditionally, demining activities in Cambodia used to be based on large teams working in
suspected mined areas to clear large areas that had been reported (perhaps as far back as
the UNTAC period in the early 1990s ) as being potentially mined. All three of the main
mine action implementing agencies (CMAC, HALO and MAG) now field a number of
smaller, more flexible teams that are more geared to problem solving than simply clearing
large areas of suspected land. These smaller teams may operate in an integrated manner
with MRE and EOD personnel available to solve problems ‘on the spot’ after a
consultative process with the target community. However, there is no standard way to
organise of mine clearance assets, and a number of larger demining ‘platoons’ are still
fielded by CMAC.
Analysis
An analysis of mine clearance can be simplified by the following questions14:
•

Are mine clearance teams doing the right job?

•

Are mine clearance teams doing the job right?

14

Thanks to Ted Paterson of GICHD for the description of these questions
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“Doing the job right” is the subject of Chapter Six (Standards). The question considered
here is: are we doing the right job?
In the past, lack of adequate casualty data, plus a lack of understanding of the impact of
mines on local communities meant that demining teams were deployed on areas where
contamination had been found or was suspected. CMVIS has allowed re-prioritisation
based on casualty data but this creates a tension between agencies as this still suggests a
single criterion approach and not all agencies are primarily focused on the numbers of
casualties. Furthermore, the number of casualties is remaining comparatively constant and
this could be misinterpreted as suggesting that clearance is having little or no impact.
There are other problems to the use of casualty data as a single criterion. These include:
•

Concentrating response on solely areas that have casualties may be, in effect,
penalising communities that are trying to adopt safe behaviour 15

•

There is insufficient data to confirm that casualty numbers will not go up in ‘lower
casualty’ areas in the future, especially where demand for land increases

•

There is a question about how casualty data can be interpreted: current practice appears
to focus on absolute casualty numbers whereas it may also be appropriate to consider
the risk of injury per head of population as a means of addressing equity problems 16 in
terms of access to emergency intervention.

It would be more appropriate to consider landmine contamination as a multi-criteria
problem, of which casualty numbers are an important – but not the only – criterion.
Indeed, casualty numbers themselves appear to be a symptom of three main dimensions:
•

The physical presence of landmines

•

A demand for the land

•

A willingness to enter the land, perhaps even when ‘mine aware’

When any one of these dimensions is not present, there is unlikely to be a casualty. This
means that there are indeed different potential solutions to the casualty problem, including:
•

Removing the landmines

•

Removing the demand for the land, through provision of alternative livelihood
possibilities, where such activity is feasible

15

Handicap International staff were able to suggest several areas where communities are
refraining from entering suspected mined areas
16

For example, CMVIS data for 2003 shows 5 casualties in Mondulkiri and 169 for Battambang.
Absolute numbers suggest that the problem is more than 33x bigger in Battambang, However,
when adjusted for population, Mondulkiri has a population of around 40,000 and Battambang has a
population of around 962,000. Therefore the risk per 1000 person is 0.125 in Mondulkiri and 1.76 in
Battambang.
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•

Removing the willingness to enter the land, perhaps by more focused MRE and better
marking

Experience with the community-based mine risk reduction approach now being followed
by CMAC/Handicap International and by MAG may provide further data on the efficacy
of the last of these interventions: the potential benefit of a KAP study to provide objective
data on the efficacy of MRE would also help understand this issue as mentioned above in
Chapter 2 on “Scoping the Problem17”.
Once one has controlled for the awareness of the situation, the question may still be viewed
as being one of the presence of contamination plus the demand for land. This can provide
the basis for a simple multi-criteria analysis (MCA) that could help focus resources on the
areas that will have the greatest overall impact on casualties and develo pment. It may also
allow for the consideration of alternative livelihood strategy interventions as more costeffective options on a case by case basis. Existing drafts from CMAA on socio -economic
guidelines for mine action recognise the need for such criteria but as yet none have been
proposed. Such criteria could include:
•

Numbers of casualties (on an absolute and ratio basis)

•

Extent of contamination

•

Future plan for land use, including land tenure

•

Development priorities and projects

•

Population size/migration/trade routes

•

Logistic convenience (i.e. it may be more efficient to move demining assets to
contiguous tasks)

The Team have discussed these ideas extensively with personnel from the two projects
involved in this issue, Australian Volunteers International (AVI) and GeoSpatial
International (GSI). There is a growing MCA industry and there is a risk that procedures
could become too complicated and unworkable. The team recommends a COST approach
to MCA, whereby the criteria and the MCA framework must be:
•

Clear

•

Objective

•

Simple

•

Transparent

17

There are differences in opinions amongst respondents about value of MRE and marking (see
above) though there is a persuasive cas e that new settlers may know less about their immediate
environs than old established populations.
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Furthermore, it is important to establish the criteria and build the analytical framework
before the framework is populated with data from real potential projects, as there is a risk
that planners will bend criteria to fit a pre-conceived idea of priority.
This leaves the question of to what extent management of this issue should be retained at
the centre or delegated to local authorities. This question is discussed in more detail in the
chapter on Institutional Arrangements (Chapter 4), but in principle the Team endorses the
view that detailed priority setting should be carried out at the provincial level building on
the existing Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) structures. The Team notes that there are
only MAPU structures in five provinces, even though the landmine problem extends
beyond these provinces (and the UXO problem is of course even more extensive). Whilst
recognising the value in minimising transaction costs through keeping the number of
MAPU small, there is a risk that this will create an institutional bias towards directing mine
action resources into these provinces even where there is (or where there may become) a
valid need elsewhere. This suggests a role for the centre in monitoring the situation and
intervening to establish further MAPU (or something with a similar role but of a smaller
scale to deal with UXO problems) as the need arises.
Recommendations
•

Mine clearance prioritisation should be regarded as a multi-criteria issue

•

Criteria setting and analysis should be clear, objective, simple and transparent

•

The MAPU process should be reinforced to facilitate objective prioritisation within
general national guidelines.

•

The extent of the MAPU program should be reviewed periodically in order to ensure
that adequate cover is provided to the non-MAPU provinces as appropriate.
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6.

Standards

Key issues
•

Current demining program and practices do not meet demand

•

Large informal demining sector, adherence to standards is patchy

•

Numerous discussions on ‘lowering standards’ as means of meeting requirement

Description
The number of mine accidents in Cambodia – continuing at around 800 per year 18 suggest
that the current mine action program does not meet the demand for clearance. Mine action
agencies are only able to clear a fraction of the problem every year, and this has led to a
growing number of ‘informal demining’ service providers who either clear their own land
or who rent out their services – at a rate far below that charged by the formal mine action
sector – to those willing to pay. Rates have been reported to the Team as low as $60 (per
Ha) 19. Even recent shifts of demining focus to areas with the highest reported accident
rates do not appear to have been having much effect on reducing the total number of
accidents20.
Even after removal of ‘bad land’ (such as rock outcrops and swamps) and land that has
already been cleared from the Level One Survey, there is still a very large amount of land
left to be addressed. The 2004-2008 plan by CMAA suggested that only 10% of the
potentially contaminated ground would eventually need to be cleared, though this was an
admitted guess by CMAA, and CMAA staff could provide no guidance on how to identify
which 10% should be cleared.
A number of respondents have suggested that, as the current rate of progress of the formal
sector is insufficient, and as it also appears to be ‘unsustainable,’ then a paradigm shift
should be undertaken in order to harness the potential for informal demining.
There are also discussio ns of a number of possible ‘risk reduction’ strategies that would
allow demining agencies to cover more ground more quickly for the same amount of
funding. This is problematic as it is an area where current international standards21 provide
little guidance on options that are available. Another option that is being discussed is, in
essence, a re-survey of contaminated areas in order to re-define the problem, though it is
difficult to see how this could produce a significantly different outcome if the same
PRA/RRA techniques are used.

18
19

CMVIS
Rate quoted to an ADB consultant for clearance of a rubber plantation in the east of Cambodia.

20

Although it is possible that accident rates could have been even higher without this intervention,
given that there is a reported increase of settlement into contaminated areas
21

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), compiled by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
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Analysis
Firstly, it is possible to break down the question of ‘capacity shortfall’ into three
component factors. These are represented in the diagram at Fig 6.1 below.

0
Impact of contamination

Extent of contamination

Efficiency

Figure 6-1. Factors contributing to shortfall in demining capacity

Essentially, one can establish that the problem gets worse the further one travels along any
of the vectors away from point ‘0’. In other words, if the extent and the impact of the
contamination are fixed, one can only improve the situation by varying the methodology
employed to get more demining done for the money. This is what appears to be
underpinning the aspiration to ‘reduce’ standards, either by engaging informal demining or
by some sort of ‘risk reduction’ strategy. However, this is based on the false assumption
that both extent and impact are fixed: as demonstrated in the chapter on scoping the
problem, it is possible to reduce the extent of the problem by disregarding land that is of
little or no economic value.
It is the belief of the Team that the problem can also be reduced by focusing on the impact
question, and disregarding land that is reportedly potentially contaminated but that appears
to be of no problem to local population – i.e. land that is already in use (see Table 6-1
below). Both of these concepts are used in the scoping exercise to reduce the potential
contamination from approximately 4600km2 to around 460km2, though it may be possible
to reduce this further 22. Furthermore, incremental changes in efficiency (without changing

22

Coincidentally, this is around the same figure as the guess made by CMAA technical advisors referred to
above, though perhaps with some clearer ‘decision science’ involved. The methodology used in this Report
also allows identification of where this ‘10%’ can be found, as it is focussed on the disused farmland reported
in the JICA land use map. As mentioned in the chapter on scoping, re-mapping the JICA data should provide
an even smaller target area.
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standards) would also improve the ability of existing methodologies to cope with the
problem, as discussed in the chapter on funding modalities.
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Table 6-1: Contamination categories for prioritisation
Ser

Category

Description

Impact

Possible courses of action

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

1

Definitely Clear

Land that has clearance record, or is patently clear
(such as concrete road)

(1) Accept land as cleared. No
further mine action
intervention necessary

2

Probably Clear

Land that appears to be clear, where locals have the
land in use, there are no mine indicators (i.e. no
records of contamination or casualty) but where
there is no clearance certificate and where there
may be isolated mines or UXO. Poor record
keeping may disguise fact that land has already
been cleared

Locals do not have a problem with
using it. No liability issues from
accept ing this land as previously
cleared.
Locals do not have a problem with
using it, but there may be residual
liability issues for management
organisations.

3

Probably Mined

Land that is does not appear to be in use, where
there are mine indicators nearby, but no specific
mine indicators in the area under consideration

In general, locals do not use the
land, though there may be
evidence
of
some
informal
demining
Clear risk for all types of land use

4

Definitely Mined

Land where there are specific indications of mine
presence, such as minefield marking, mine
incidents or visible mines or mine fragments

In general, locals do not use the
land. Less chance of informal
demining
Very high risk for all types of land
use
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(2) Disregard land for mine action
prioritisation, as it does not
appear a problem
(3) Conduct some form of
negative
confirmation
to
improve confidence in land if
it is of particular importance
to do so
(4) Conduct area reduction (AR)
to establish boundary of
contamination where suitable
AR means are available
(5) Clear land using standard
clearance techniques if it has
sufficient value
(6) Mark, fence and avoid land
that does not have sufficient
value
(5) Clear land using standard
clearance techniques if it has
sufficient value
(6) Mark, fence and avoid land
that does not have sufficient
value

It is therefore possible to reduce the extent and the impact of the problem (by concentrating
on land that is either probably mined or definitely mined, and that has intrinsic economic
value) to such an extent that there may be no need to discuss changes in clearance
standards.
On the other hand, one may feel that it might also be possible to benefit from reducing
standards in order to either make more benefit from increased efficiency or to engage in a
more ‘sustainable’ approach that will survive the end of international funding.
Nevertheless, there remain several other significant problems in changing standards, and
these are set out below.
For example, the Team members have heard suggestions framed as follows
“If we can achieve 80% of the solution with much less effort, this must surely be better
than clearing a small area very thoroughly”
This is a very persuasive, even seductive argument. It is however based on several false
premises:
•

How do we know we have an 80% solution? The recent development in machine
testing only measures the performance of machines in ideal circumstances.23
In other words, even where a machine demonstrates 80% effectiveness (and there is
some lack of clarity about what this means24) in test conditions, because all minefields
are different it would be impossible to assess what actual percentage effectiveness
would be achievable in real life. Similar problems appear when trying to determine an
80% solution through manual means. In essence, formal manual demining is a binary
activity: one either does it right or not at all. It would be impossible to persuade trained
deminers to work faster, search less deep or ignore risks of mines and UXO buried in
dense vegetation, as they would know that this was dangerous.
Whilst it might be possible to engage untrained informal deminers who were ignorant
of such safety issues, this would leave questions of legal or moral liability, as discussed
below.

23

Paper by Dr Christina Mueller (presented at the EUDEM conference in Brussels, September 2003). Work
by the German non-destructive testing agency (BAM) explains that the reliability of a demining system can
be set out by the following function:
R = f(Ic – Af – Hf)
Where
R = System reliability
Ic = Intrinsic capability (performance in ideal conditions)
Af = application factors, including environment
Hf = human factors
24

For example, does this mean that the machine can deal 100% effectively with 80% of mine types, that it
will destroy 80% of mines in a minefield, covers 80% of the surface of the area, or that it has an 80% chance
of destroying each individual mine?
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•

How do we define a contract? One of the major advantages with the current standard
as defined in IMAS (i.e. that clearance should be 100% effective to a stated depth) is
that it is very clear to measure and identify when the standard has not been met. Given
the very low density of mines per m2, even in a minefield, it is inevitable that a lowerstandard contract may leave ‘permissible’ mines behind. This would be exacerbated in
circumstances where an unscrupulous demining agency could gamble that an area is
probably clear and report it as cleared without taking any action to clear it, as any
mines subsequently found would be “the ones we were allowed to miss”.

•

How to avoid liability. Given that the whole point of such activity would be to release
land for subsequent use faster, it would be difficult to persuade end users that they
should use land with ‘only 200 mines left’ after 800 had been removed from a field of
1000 mines (even assuming that we knew how many had been there) was actually safe
to use. It would be difficult to construct a statement of certification of fitness to use that
was persuasive enough to encourage people to occupy the land without then exposing
all the agencies in the contractual chain to liability and potential litigation, especially as
activity to cut costs at the expense of safety contravenes most national health and safety
legislation as well as ISO 18000. This is an area where a sin of commission (engaging
in less than safe activity) is probably more dangerous from a legal perspective than a
sin of omission (observing others engage in less than safe activity)25.

•

How to avoid moral problems? The liability problem described above could also be
described as a moral issue in circumstances where an agency might expect to escape
the rule of law. There is also another, international dimension to this: donor countries
have very high standards of clearance in their own territories (and many donor
countries have areas of old military ranges or battlefields that are still being cleared
today) and there is a significant moral ‘north-south’ question of whether it is acceptable
to expect high standards of safety at home and then actively engage in less safe
practices in a developing country.

Other standards issues
Nevertheless, there are some problems with international standards and their Cambodian
counterparts (CMAS). The main problems are:
•

The IMAS standard on post clearance sampling is expensive to implement, adding an
additional 20-30% cost to existing demining programs (if it is actually done at all) 26

•

The existing mapping and database suite, IMSMA (information management system
for mine action) is clumsy and difficult to operate; Cambodia believes that funding si
linked to adoption of this software and is spending considerable human resource effort
on transposing data from existing and effective database management systems to
IMSMA for no local benefit.

25

Interestingly, the researcher undertaking current Handicap International study on village demining reports
that he has, as yet, found no evidence t hat local population would choose an “80% solution” where there is a
choice. He reports that 100% of all respondents have stated they would rather wait for full clearance. He
believes this is because they feel that they are already living with an 80% solut ion and see no added benefit
from any such intervention.
26

Horvard Bach, GICHD
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•

The existing IMAS standards on technical survey and area reduction are weak and
provide little or no guidance on how to implement such practices (See Chapter 7).

The situation can be summed up so far as follows:
•

Informal demining is an indicator that current paradigm for the provision of mine
clearance services doesn’t work, and that people despair of the existing structures
providing a solution to their problems

•

There is an assumption that other faster and cheaper techniques (such as MRE, fencing)
cannot solve the problem (see notes on techniques in Chapter 7 below)

•

Scoping the problem appears to reduce the effective extent and impact of mine
contamination

•

There is also likely to be an effect on the mine action sector’s ability to meet demand if
funding mechanisms act to lower price of demining services

•

Improving productivity is also key to improving the current situation

•

International standards are not monolithic and there is some room for removing
standards that provide unnecessary transaction costs (IMSMA) and implementation
costs (quality control sampling)

What should be done if there is still a large shortfall between demand and supply?
Scoping the problem and introducing Incremental improvements in efficiency appear to
have the ability to meet the demand providing that sufficient funds are available to support
mine action at a rate of approximately $16m per year for the next 10-15 years. However,
while this does provide a light at the end of the tunnel it may be that this is still a tunnel
that is too long for the international community. There is a spectrum of potential responses
that provide alternative paradigms for mine action in Cambodia. These are set out below in
Table 6-2 below.

Recommendations
•

The shortfall in capacity should be understood as a result of three factors: extent of
contamination, impact of contamination and clearance methodology. Scoping the
problem can reduce the shortfall

•

Better funding mechanisms can encourage efficiency (see Ser 2 in Table 6-2 below)

•

It is difficult to operationalise ‘lower standard’ methods and this should be avoided

•

There is room to reform existing standards to remove unnecessary burdens

38

•

There is potential to train and equip sustainable national capacities in the Cambodian
police and army to deal with residual problems (see Ser 4 in Table 6-2 below)
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Table 6-2 - Alternative standards for mine action in Cambodia
Ser
(a)
1

Paradigm
(b)
Trained and Managed

Description
(c)
The current situation

2

Trained and Managed and
responsive to market

Proposed solution

3

The 80/20% solution

Use of machines to
cover areas

4

National capacity
development

Train and equip army
and police

5

Trained and unmanaged

6

Untrained and unmanaged

Providing training and
equipment to informal
deminers, but not
managing them
Complete
disengagement from
mine action sector by
international sector

Implications
(d)
+ No problems meeting standards
- Problems meeting demand
- Unsustainable
+ No problems meeting standards
+ No need for sustainability
- May s till be problems meeting
demand, though this should be dealt
with through MAPU
+ Cheaper
- Appears to help meet demand, but
several large problems with definition
and operationalisation
+ Cheap
+ Able to meet need for residual
capacity
- Not yet able to meet standards
- Concerns about land grabbing
+ Wou ld help meet some demand
- Would be unlikely to meet standards
- Liability issues
- Unlikely to assist ultra-poor
+ Cheap
- Would not meet standards
- May prevent development agencies in
engaging in projects
- Counter to desire to assist in mine
action
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Remarks
(e)
Unsustainable in terms of efficiency (as indicated by
costs) and effectiveness (as indicated by large informal
demining sector)
Including responsiveness on price, use of proximity
demining, and incentives for dynamic efficiency

Sometimes described as ‘quick and dirty’

Could be a manageable approach in the medium to long
term. See chapter on institutional arrangements

Could be possible exit strategy for international
community if there is a continued shortfall However,
trained deminers are likely to work on contract for those
who are able to pay rather than work for the ultra poor

7.

Techniques

Mine Clearance
There are a number of demining techniques in use in Cambodia. Many elements of these
techniques are standard and present no issues for this report. The following notes
concentrate on highlighting particularly good initiatives or areas for potential
improvement.
Manual demining
Manual demining is the least controversial of the techniques at use in Cambodia. It still
provides the mainstay of mine clearance and can be considered the ‘default option’ for
conducting clearance. It is, however, very slow. As most costs are fixed it is very sensitive
to increases in productivity and good management can wring significant increases in
output. In many cases these can be simple management processes, such as the 23-day
rotation developed by HALO Trust to minimise the impact of remote deployment on their
deminers.
One noteworthy and positive development in Cambodia is the development of integrated
mine action teams, such as the ‘Community Based Mine Risk Reduction’ (CBMRR) teams
fielded by CMAC with assistance from Handicap International (HI) 27 . Whilst this approach
does not necessarily provide any particular improvement in efficiency (it uses the same
manual clearance processes used by other demining teams) it does offer an improvement in
effectiveness as it allows direct targeting of the resources to solve problems in the task area,
including timely removal of UXO as soon as it is reported and clearance of small, vital
areas (such as water sources) combined with marking of safe routes. The wider use of
CBMRR teams is strongly recommended.
MAG is experimenting with the use of local people in ‘proximity demining’ projects which
is an interesting bridge between conventional demining and informal demining. Under this
approach, MAG will be able to significantly reduce cash spent on salaries and
accommodation, and, furthermore, these salaries will be targeted at the local villagers, so
giving the proximity demining project additional value as a rural income generation
activity.
HALO Trust is the leader in the development of the One-Man, One-Lane (OMOL)
technique, which is a way to significantly increase the productivity of individual deminers.
It is noted that MAG have now adopted this technique and CMAC are encouraged to
follow suit.28
There are some developments that may be less effective. For example, convention is that
deminers clear lanes of one metre width. The Team understands that a wider lane width is
being considered for use in Cambodia: this can have problems as a result of the
ergonomics of detector use, particularly at the edge of the lane, where the detector is
27

The concept was originally developed by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in 1999.

28

It should be noted that not all metal detectors are ergonomically suitable for OMOL. This should be taken
into account in selection of future equipment.
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swung in a noticeable arc. Mines at the extreme edge of a wide lane can be missed, though
this problem varies with type of detector29 .
Mechanical demining
Although the mine action sector habitually uses the phrase ‘mechanical demining’ it is
often more accurate to talk about mechanically-assisted demining as it is rarely possible for
machines to achieve 100% clearance30 . When machines are used to prepare ground for
manual deminers, it is their ability to safely increase the cost-effectiveness of manual
demining that is their most significant attribute. This ground preparation is most important
in the Cambodian demining context in terms of their ability to remove vegetation, though
they can have a useful role in removing metal fragmentation if they are fitted with suitable
magnets.
There are, however, a number of pitfalls in selecting machines. MAG and HALO are
familiar with these issues and are able to select the equipment that is most suitable for their
activities. CMAC has free donations of Japanese equipment but this is a two-edged sword:
the donations ease CMAC’s financial requirements but they restrict CMAC’s ability to
choose the equipment. Furthermore, there are some doubts that the equipment is the most
cost-effective available on the market. For example, smaller teams need access to smaller
equipment or else the equipment wastes valuable working time either sitting idle on one
site or traveling between work sites. Such equipment is available in Cambodia in the form
of the locally-produced TEMPEST device and it is recommended that CMAC consider the
use of TEMPEST (or similar sized devices) in support of their smaller CBMRR teams in
concert with their larger machines.
Mine Detecting Dogs
Mine Detecting Dogs (MDD) are in use in Cambodia as a result of a significant investment
by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). Originally established within
CMAC by the Swedish Armed Forces, the project is now managed with technical
assistance from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). The program has taken a long time to
become effective and there have been lingering reports about problems with the
management of the dog teams, though the Permanent Advisory Team provided by GICHD
report that these problems are in the past. There is, however, as yet no quantitative
measurement of the ability of the dogs to enhance cost effectiveness of demining by
CMAC, though GICHD have undertaken to carry out such a study.
Area Reduction
Area Reduction is the term for a process by which a suspected mined area with vague
undefined boundaries is reduced to a smaller area containing the actual contamination,
with the outer areas then being released for use without further clearance activity.
Unfortunately, at present this is more of an aspiration than a valid technique, and it is also
a subject where IMAS provide little guidance on how area reduction should be done. In
29

A useful technical handbook on this subject is available from the EC Joint Research Centre at
Ispra, Italy
30

One exception to this is where machines are used to excavate and remove soil containing mines,
which can be particularly suitable for clearing roads.
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principle, Cambodia has access to a potential area reduction technique through the
combined use of vegetation clearance machines and dogs, and this is probably the most
cost-effective use of dogs.
There are also reports that CMAC is considering the re-introduction of an older,
discredited technique that involves manual deminers entering a suspected area at regular
intervals (15 metres) and then using the lanes produced by these deminers to establish the
boundaries of mined areas. Frankly, there is no need to re-trial this technique: it does not
work (and it has been proved not to work), as it can miss entire minefields where these are
laid in a non-patterned manner, such as that employed by the Khmer Rouge.
Level Two and Technical Survey
There are related problems with the terms ‘Level Two Survey’ and ‘Technical Survey’.
Again, there is no single agreed definition for either terms31 and both have been used
interchangeably to describe all of the following:
•

More detailed investigation of the impact of the contamination, using a combination of
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques.
However, it is difficult to see how a mass re-survey could add value to the existing
Level One Survey (L1S) as it is essentially the same technique used in the original
L1S. Such survey work can be done on a site-by-site basis as part of the task planning
process (and is already included in the task assessment phase of the CBMRR
approach).

•

Technical investigation of the minefield to establish the nature of the contamination.
This is a common technique though frankly it is difficult to understand how it adds
value in low-density mined areas.

•

Establishment of the boundaries of the area for subsequent clearance, including
preparation of a baseline for clearanc e teams. Again, whilst this is a useful function it is
difficult to see why this cannot continue to be done on a site-by-site basis (as carried
out by HALO and MAG at present). There is also a risk that this process (which does
not include area reduction) could be misinterpreted as having ‘cleared’ the original
suspect contaminated area and be reported accordingly.

In short, the Team is not persuaded of the need for a comprehensive National Level 2 or
Technical Survey.
Negative Confirmation
There may be some opportunity for the use of dogs and/or machines in the concept of
‘negative confirmation’ whereby the dogs/machines are used to check an area that is
‘probably clear (see Chapter 6 on Standards). This could have a role in risk reduction for
risk-averse agencies conducting development projects – however it may be argued that in
general, if the land does not present a problem for the local community, mine action assets
would still be better utilised to clear areas where they do have a problem (i.e. probably or
definitely mined areas). Furthermore, there is still little common understanding of the
31

Both have also been used to describe the area reduction by lane probing method described above.
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concept of negative confirmation in the international mine action sector and this is an area
where more research is required.
Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)
QA/QC is a vital component of mine action as it is the main way in which donors can be
sure that mine action implementing agencies are ‘doing the job right’. The Team finds that
there is only a patchy and sporadic provision of quality management services in Cambodia.
This varies from the comprehensive QA/QC cover provided under the CMAC Demining
Unit 3 Project in Pailin, to an almost complete lack of external QA/QC cover in CMAC
DU2, 4 and 5, HALO Trust and MAG. To be comprehensive, technical QA/Q C must be
carried out by technically qualified and independent personnel, and must be linked with
conventional financial audits.
New technologies
The history of mine action is littered with the remnants of promises of new technology that
have failed to deliver the advances that they have claimed. There are few new technologies
on the horizon that have the potential to provide genuine improvements. The one notable
exception is the concept of a dual-sensor mine detector that includes a combination of
metal detector and a new ground-penetrating radar. This offers the potential for deminers
to ignore the large number of metal fragments that generate false alarms and can each take
around 15 minutes to investigate32. However, these detectors are still in development and
there has been no analysis of their impact on cost-effectiveness

Explosive Ordnance Disposal
There is little to say at a strategic level about techniques used in EOD in Cambodia. One
area that does deserve comment, however, is the recent introduction of Improvised
Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) training in CMAC. IEDD techniques have no place in
teams intended to conduct conventional munition disposal techniques against unexploded
ordnance (UXO), as IEDD techniques are intended for use against locally-fabricated
devices used by criminals and terrorists. It is true that CMAC periodically receive calls to
assist with IEDD tasks on behalf of the security forces in Cambodia, and it is clearly better
for the safety of the teams for them to have training than for them not to have training.
However, this can only be a short-term fix as the provision of an IEDD capacity in CMAC
has the following significant, structural problems:
•

CMAC is not mandated to carry out security activities 33

•

CMAC EOD teams are funded by donors to carry out humanitarian activities and their
use on IEDD tasks may be deflecting their work elsewhere

•

Provision of IEDD response by CMAC blurs the roles of humanitarian and security
agencies

32

Presentation by Cyterra Inc on the HSTAMIDS mine detector at the 2004 EUDEM conference,
Brussels September 2004.
33

As explained by General Ouk Kim Lek of the Royal Cambodian Police
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•

CMAC is unlikely to be a sustainable home for IEDD activities as it is almost wholly
dependent on external funding

Whilst it is recognized that there is a short term urgent shortfall in IEDD capacity in
Cambodia, which may be easiest resolved by use of CMAC resources in the immediate
term, it is strongly recommended that a more sustainable IEDD capacity be developed
within Cambodian security forces, such as the Police.
There is one non-technical observation about EOD activity, as raised in the workshop on
Tampering held at MEDICAM on 2 December 2004. This is that, where EOD teams take
away the scrap metal remnants of items of UXO that they have cleared, there is an
economic disincentive for the poorer parts of Cambodian society to report UXO if there is
a market for such scrap. A simple change in organizational procedures to direct EOD
teams to leave the scrap behind for the villagers would solve this problem.
One related set of techniques that has been traditionally kept separate from EOD agencies
in Cambodia is the set of techniques used in ‘Small Arms and Light Weapon Reduction’
(SALW). Theoretically a set of techniques to destroy small arms (and thus technically not
an EOD problem) in practice SALW practitioners are often presented with items of
ammunition (and even UXO) and must therefore have access to an EOD capability. There
may be some scope in bringing SALW techniques under qualified EOD supervision in the
future.

Mine Risk Education (MRE)
As mentioned in the chapter on scoping, there is little quantitative evidence on the efficacy
of MRE activities in Cambodia. There are, in essence, three possible MRE interventions:
•

Community based MRE presentations

•

Schools based MRE presentations

•

Mass media MRE ‘spots’

It is the opinion of the Team that only the first of these should really be considered as the
business of mine action implementation agencies. The other two are probably more
appropriately mainstreamed within general public health “Information Education
Communication” (IEC) activities, with mine action specialists providing technical advice
on content, but not on message delivery techniques. Community based MRE presentations
are also much more likely to be effective when combined with integrated mine action
solutions (such as the CBMRR approach described above), where they can also he lp to link
reports of mine and UXO with an immediate remediation response.
The one area of MRE that appears to be particularly under -represented in Cambodia is the
lack of such training for expatriates working on general aid and development projects.
Donors and aid program managers should be aware that the failure to provide such safety
training is likely to be considered a failure of ‘duty of care’ and would doubtless result in
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litigation in the event of a mine accident involving expatriate staff. There is therefore a
need for provision of such services in Cambodia.
A series of recommendations for the implementation of mine action techniques are
included below.

Recommendations
The following recommendations are made in respect of mine action techniques in
Cambodia:
•

Agencies should continue to investigate means to improve cost-effectiveness and
efficiency of their services.

•

The OMOL drill should be more widely adopted.

•

The CBMRR approach should be more widely adopted.

•

More work needs to be done on the integration of dogs and machines into demining
activities.

•

There is no case for a stand-alone ‘Technical Survey’, Level 2 Survey or Re-Survey of
Cambodia.

•

Work needs to be done on developing suitable techniques for area reduction.

•

The program needs a comprehensive and coherent quality management capacity.

•

Potential new technologies should be critically scrutinized in light of their true capacity
to improve cost-effectiveness.

•

A longer-term approach is needed for the provision of IEDD capacity in Cambodia.

•

EOD teams should be organized so they not be seen as being in competition with scrap
metal dealers

•

MRE is best integrated into CBMRR or public health ICE activities.

•

There is need for development agencies to have access to MRE training for new
arrivals.
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